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6. Mainstreaming Indigenous 
Service Delivery 
Professor Ian Marsh 
From 1988 until 2004, the policy framework for indigenous affairs in and beyond remote 
Australia marched to a different drumbeat.  In this period there was an effort, via the 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC), to build a separate structure 
which both redressed indigenous disadvantage and created a context for Indigenous voice 
and engagement. ATSIC had been established in 1987. By the time of the election of the 
Howard government (1996) ATSICs achievements had been increasingly overwhelmed in 
public and indigenous perceptions by its failings. Following an enquiry, which 
recommended a contrary course, and not without substantial controversy, ATSIC was 
abolished in 2004 (Hannaford, Huggins and Collins, 2003; also submissions from W. 
Gray and W. Sanders: the report and these submissions all recommended a re-structured 
organisation). Abolition received bipartisan support. Thereafter policy was 
‘mainstreamed’ with responsibility for ATSIC programmes distributed relevant line 
departments. 
The abolition of ATSIC was accompanied by a new governance structure. This involved at 
least three elements: the development of strategic capacity and focus within the 
Commonwealth government; the development of federal-state machinery; and the 
establishment of new on-the-ground delivery arrangements. These are briefly considered. 
Strategic leadership by the federal government:  
In March 2000, in an endeavour to impart a more positive orientation to indigenous 
policy, the Howard government espoused what it labelled ‘practical reconciliation’. This 
explicitly acknowledged the leadership role of the national government.17 It aimed to 
improve conditions on the ground in relation to health, housing, education and health.  
In 2001, the Howard government invited the Commonwealth Grants Commission (CGC) 
to undertake a comprehensive review of gaps in indigenous access to services and of 
funding arrangements. A decade later, without significant gain in outcomes, it is salutary 
to recall the core points of this report: 
‘The social economic and cultural circumstances of Indigenous Australians differ 
greatly between urban, regional and remote locations. The services provided….how 
they are provided and the costs of providing them differ with location. 
Mainstream programs do not adequately meet the needs of Indigenous people 
because of barriers to access. These barriers include the way programmes are 
designed, how they are funded, how they are presented and their costs to users.   
                                                        
17 Grattan, M. ‘Howard practices a sorry argument’,Sydney Morning Herald, 30 March 2000, p. 8. 
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In all regions, across all functional areas examined in our enquiry Indigenous 
people experience entrenched levels of disadvantage compared to non-Indigenous 
people. 
It is clear from all available evidence that mainstream services do not meet the 
needs of Indigenous people.  
It should be expected that their use of mainstream services would be at greater 
levels than those of non-Indigenous Australians. This is not the case. Indigenous 
Australians access mainstream services at much lower rates than non-Indigenous 
people. 
Some essential features (of program development) include….Indigenous control of, 
or strong influence over, service delivery expenditure and regional and local service 
delivery arrangements that emphasise community development, inter-agency 
cooperation and’ general effectiveness.’ 
The CGC noted that mainstream services are mostly planned and delivered to meet the 
requirements of the most common users and do not allow for the extreme disadvantage 
and special needs of Indigenous people, a point echoed in other analyses. For example: 
Dillon and Westbury conclude: ‘Program design is invariably undertaken centrally and 
given the relatively small size of niche programs; “one-size-fits-all” approaches are 
inevitable’ (p. 69) 
In 2002, joined-up government was launched with trial at eight indigenous sites. In May 
2004, following the abolition of ATSIC, the government established a Ministerial 
Taskforce on Indigenous Issues. The idea was to create a Cabinet level committee to drive 
the ‘practical reconciliation’ process.18 This was supported by a Secretaries Group which 
was designed to coordinate implementation. To continue Indigenous representation, a 
new nominated National Indigenous Council was also established. At an administrative 
level, an Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination was also established, first in DIMIA 
and later in FaCSIA.  
Meantime, programs formerly administered by ATSIC were transferred to mainstream 
departments with the employment program (CDEP - $574 million in 2006-07 budget) 
transferred to DEWR and the housing program (CHIP - $292 million) transferred to 
FaCSIA. Program development was to be informed by three priority themes: early 
childhood intervention, safer communities, and building indigenous wealth, employment 
and an entrepreneurial culture.   
To effect change at the local level, Shared Responsibility Agreements (SRAs) were to be 
signed covering particular measures. In addition, to build coordinated action these were 
to be backed by Regional Partnership Agreements (RPAs). By 2007, 180 SRAs and 3 
RPAs had been signed. These are detailed in an Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) 
                                                        
18 Ministerial Taskforce on Indigenous Affairs available at 
http://www.atns.net.au/agreement.asp?entityID=2330 
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evaluation (2009). Indicating the importance of mainstream programs, these 
arrangements represented a very small proportion of the overall budget which then stood 
at $3.5 billion. Likewise, in 2006-07 only $75 million over 4 years was committed by eight 
government departments for SRAs in a total indigenous budget of around $3 billion.  
(Hunt, 2007, p. 163). 
To implement these arrangements, thirty multi-agency Indigenous Coordinating Centres 
(ICCs) were established in urban, rural and remote Australia. By 2006, some 562 staff 
members were assigned to ICCs (approx 19 staff per centre). They assumed three main 
roles: program administration; solution brokering to provide a bridge between community 
needs and departmental programs; and developing SRAs with local communities. ICC 
mangers were the key. 
Meantime, in June 2006, a Summit on domestic violence and child abuse in indigenous 
communities was convened. This included representatives of state and federal 
governments. The participants agreed to examine a range of proposals, including ‘a 
greater role for a network of Aboriginal seniors’.19 These recommendations were discussed 
at a COAG meeting in July. In December, the federal minister released his blueprint for 
action. Its three key points were the same as those announced in May 2004: early 
childhood intervention, safer communities, and building an entrepreneurial culture. 
In June 2007, five months before an anticipated election, the report, Little Children are 
Sacred, was published. It documented distressing levels of child sexual abuse. Its release 
was accompanied by much media fanfare. Six days later the federal government 
announced its emergency intervention, the Northern Territory Emergency Response 
(NTER). It described the level of child sexual abuse as a national emergency.20 As noted 
earlier, this response effectively repudiated processes and approaches that had been 
unfolding over the previous seven years. 
In 2008, after defeat of the Howard government, the NTER was reviewed (2009) and the 
government subsequently modified its operation in a number of areas. Emphasis returned 
to community consultations and the ICC process.    
Federal-State Collaboration: Commonwealth-State collaboration in Indigenous affairs 
commenced in 1992 when the newly established Council of Australian Governments 
(COAG) adopted a ‘National Commitment to Improved Outcomes for Indigenous People’. 
This was lifted to a new level in November 2000 when COAG adopted a Framework to 
Advance Aboriginal Reconciliation. In Aril 2002, COAG endorsed the whole-of-
government trials, which were discussed previously. This approach was continued by the 
Rudd government. Its election in 2007 was followed by a renewed commitment to 
Indigenous development with COAG as the primary platform for national policy 
development.   
                                                        
19 Larissa Behrendt, Indigenous Policy: law and order is only part of the solution, Australian 
Policy Online, 3 July 2006, accessed at www.apo.org.au  
20 See FaCSIA media release 21 June 2007 
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In 2008, COAG agreed to six ambitious targets to ‘close the gap’: 
 Close  the gap in life expectancy within a generation 
 Halve the gap in mortality rates for indigenous children under five within a decade 
 Ensure all indigenous four year olds in remote communities have access to early 
childhood education within five years 
 Halve the gap for Indigenous students in reading, writing and numeracy within a 
decade. 
 Halve the gap for Indigenous students in Year 12 attainment or equivalent 
attainment rates by 2020 
 Halve the gap in employment outcomes between Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
Australians within a decade. 
Government efforts were focused on seven building blocks or ‘strategic areas for action’: 
early childhood, schooling, health, economic participation, healthy homes, safe 
communities; governance and leadership – the latter involving Indigenous communities 
not the wider governance system that was to deliver on these goals. These building blocks 
have become the focus of the Productivity Commissions biannual assessment and also of 
the (briefer) annual report by the Prime Minister (e.g. Prime Minister, 2011). We will see 
later in the discussion of strategic policy making that the theory of development, implicit 
in this faming, is not uncontested (Chapter 9, on page 99). We will also see that this was 
introduced without any engagements with its nominal subjects. 
There is also an intergovernmental agreement covering indigenous development 
(National Indigenous Reform Agreement – Closing the Gap, 2009) In addition, there are 
National Partnership Agreements covering inter-governmental collaboration in the 
following indigenous areas: Remote Service Delivery, Economic Participation, Health 
Outcomes, Early Childhood Development, Remote Housing, Remote Public Internet 
Access. This elaborate framework, which constitutes the primary governmental strategic 
design for ‘closing the gap’, continues to evolve. 
In 2010, the Indigenous Expenditure Review Group published its first report on 
expenditure on indigenous services. This sought to establish a consolidated figure based 
on three components: the costs of targeted services; estimated expenditure based on the 
direct use of services (education, health etc); and indirect expenditure based on relative 
population shares. Whilst conceptually clear, in practice these last two calculations 
proved much harder to derive. The report estimates total indigenous expenditure at $21.9 
billion or 5.3% of total general government expenditure. Estimated expenditure per head 
was just over $40 000 for Indigenous Australians compared to just over $18 000 for non-
Indigenous citizens. The report notes the differences is due to three factors – more 
intensive use of mainstream services because of higher levels of disadvantage, the 
provision of indigenous specific services and the difference in the cost of providing 
mainstream services.  
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Note the aggregated nature of these calculations. The data is also reported by state. But 
no other levels of disaggregation are reported. For example, there is no distinction 
between regions. These assessments may be relevant to later discussion of a potential 
additional role for the Commonwealth Grants Commission.  
Outcomes: 
Evaluations of outcomes are now comprehensive and periodic. For example, already in 
2011, two comprehensive documents have been presented: the 750 page biannual 
Productivity Commission report and the Prime Ministers Annual Report to Parliament 
(Prime Minister 2011). Both documents use as fundamental points of reference the closing 
the gaps headings and targets. Their appropriateness is discussed in a later Paper 
(Chapter 9, on page 84). In the Productivity Commission report results are presented 
against 37 specific sub-targets. These are proxies for broader objectives adopted by 
COAG.  They also implicitly suggest a causal structure although the systemic links 
between the various principal outcomes are not explored. For example, employment 
outcomes are not prioritised. They are co-equal with health, educational, security and 
housing outcomes. This causal assumption might be questioned. 
The data is mostly also presented in aggregate or at least state-based terms. Despite 
repeated acknowledgement of the extent to which circumstances vary by location, it is not 
disaggregated by region. 
Outcomes have barely changed. From a seven year vantage point, it is equally hard to see 
how mainstreaming has improved the circumstances of people who live in remote 
communities. The array of indicators (now 12 prime and more than 37 secondary 
measures) shows marginal gains in an absolute sense in only three indicators and, when 
measured relatively against parallel changes in outcomes for the non indigenous 
population, backward movements in every single case. According to the 2011 review, 
outcomes have improved in relation to life expectancy and young child mortality; the gap 
has increased in relation to disability and chronic diseases and child abuse and neglect; 
and there is no change in relation to most of the rest including employment, post-
secondary education, household and individual income, family and community violence, 
reading etc.  
Conclusion: 
This section has reviewed the various elements involved in the ‘mainstreaming’ of 
Indigenous service delivery. In the process the governance system has been reconfigured. 
An overall strategic framework, focusing on closing the gaps between Indigenous and 
other Australians in average outcomes in seven socio-economic dimensions has been 
established. This strategic framework has been endorsed by COAG and hence has 
attracted the support of both federal and state governments. Implementation has been 
reworked. Thirty-four Indigenous Coordination Centres have been established with a brief 
to broker programs into local regions and to bundle programs at the local level. Joint 
Responsibility Agreements, Strategic Results Agreements and Local Investment Plans 
have all been introduced to support these organisational initiatives. Finally, an elaborate 
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reporting and evaluation structure has been put in place. How effective is this suite of 
governance measures on-the-ground?  
